The Joint List and the Arab Parties – Where To?

By: Tamim Abu Khait The current situation:

After the pressure exerted by Arab society following the worsening crime crisis, and after the impact of the Gaza war on Arab society—emotionally, politically, and in everyday life, through policing practices and the relative deterioration of relations with Jewish society—the components of the Joint List held two official meetings, in addition to a series of bilateral meetings and consultations, to discuss the possibility of re-establishing the historic Joint List of 2015.

These meetings led to a clarification and reaffirmation of a fact that already existed: it is very difficult to re-establish the Joint List in its original composition, after the bitter experience of repeated elections, alliances, and splits among the partial lists that have been formed since 2015.

This is clear and leaves no room for secrets or interpretation: Ra’am adopted a strategic line of joining any government willing to accept it—regardless of that government’s policy toward the Palestinian people, and regardless of whether it is a violent right-wing government in the occupied territories. Even if Ra’am does not state this so bluntly, this is the practical meaning of its position: to obtain rights, budgets, and “achievements” for Arab society in Israel. In contrast, the other Arab parties concluded that this is not acceptable and set political conditions for joining any government, as well as somewhat different conditions for supporting a government from the outside, as occurred with support for Rabin’s government in 1993.

Today, Ra’am stands apart from the rest of the Joint List components, who are divided—and will continue to be divided—and, unfortunately, are fighting almost exclusively over one thing: the distribution of seats.

The dispute over seat allocation is particularly evident between Hadash and Balad, just as in the previous elections. Balad claims, based on the last election results, that it has voters equivalent to three Knesset seats and therefore deserves guaranteed positions. Hadash, on the other hand, relying on Israeli mainstream media polls throughout the past year, claims it is worth four seats and also demands guaranteed slots. In reality, both claims are inaccurate and unrealistic. Hadash knows that on its own it does not command a full four seats that would safely pass the electoral threshold, and the division of polling results between Hadash and Ta’al is unclear, while the popularity of MK Ahmad Tibi is very clear in all polls.

Balad also knows that it does not have voters for three seats, since many who voted for it in the previous elections did so out of solidarity and protest against the failure to form a Joint List. Moreover, there is a sharp internal dispute within Balad over whether it can run alone if no Joint List is formed, or if it is not guaranteed a certain number of seats within any alliance. What further intensified the internal struggle in Balad was Sami Abu Shehadeh’s statement about the possibility of adding a Jewish woman to Balad’s list—creating two problems: first, she would bring no voter base with her; second, she would block women from Balad’s leadership from competing for the second or third spots, which are usually contested by women.

Where to?

There are several possible future scenarios, the main two of which are both negative:

The first, and unfortunately the most likely, is that no comprehensive Joint List will be formed. Ra’am will run independently, and the other parties will run on a second list. The struggle over seat distribution will continue, while political and social issues—foremost the crime crisis—will not receive serious treatment beyond slogans and campaign propaganda. There will be no research, no programs, and no practical proposals that can be implemented, due to the internal battles over list rankings.

Seat placement and the number of Knesset members for each party are, of course, important, and competition is understandable and legitimate. But giving this issue top priority over all others—especially over unity and the creation of a single joint list—is deeply unfortunate and provokes not only concern but anger. It may also be a major factor in voters staying home or going on a long family trip on election day. It could even contribute to the continued rule of the right wing and Netanyahu—and to the continuation of disasters for both peoples.

The second scenario is the formation of three lists, as in the previous election: Ra’am; Hadash and Ta’al together; and Balad alone—a bad division that could lead to the loss of tens of thousands of votes and the wasting of precious seats.

What is required?

What is required is to achieve the largest possible number of parliamentary seats in order to help prevent the establishment of another Netanyahu government, and to create an effective pressure tool on the next government to resolve the unresolved issues of Arab society, foremost among them crime, to push for withdrawal from Gaza, to end the occupation, and to open peace negotiations.

To achieve this, the broadest possible Jewish–Arab alliance must be established, on clear foundations and with defined goals—first and foremost addressing the problems of Arab society, enforcing full equality among all citizens of the state regardless of nationality, religion, community, gender, or ethnic affiliation, and demanding an end to the occupation.

An alliance is required.A broad Jewish–Arab alliance to contest the elections is required—not merely a list of Arab parties, whether wide or narrow.

We need an alliance capable of advancing a vision for an Israeli–Palestinian compromise agreement and struggling to broaden its public support and promote it within the government. We need a civic alliance for equality and Jewish–Arab partnership that works to formulate solutions to violence and crime. We need an alliance for social justice that addresses livelihood, employment, and welfare needs equally for all citizens of the state. We need an alliance for peace—a word that is almost disappearing from the Israeli lexicon.

Such a party or alliance would say clearly: the Israeli–Palestinian conflict cannot be managed—it must be ended. And the path to this passes through ending the occupation, establishing an independent Palestinian state, and universal recognition that this land is a shared homeland for both peoples. The Israeli people must acknowledge their responsibility for the Nakba and its consequences, and recognize the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and to their own independent state. And the Palestinian people must give clear and final recognition to the State of Israel and its right to security and stability. This is where peace begins—and there will be no peace without these two conditions.

A broad Jewish–Arab alliance is required, and the Arab parties must adopt this in practice and in action—not leave it as a slogan.